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Abstract
The healthcare system in the United States has a
sophisticated and an industry-unique set of legal
requirements. At the Federal level, healthcare
entities, which capture personal identifying
information (PII) and also financially bill customers,
are under two major laws Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and
Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act (HITECH). The HITECH law
requires public notifications of healthcare breaches
consisting of 500 or more individuals.
The
notifications are posted to the US Health and Human
Services (HHS) Office of Civil Rights (OCR) Breach
Portal for the public to review. This research
analyzes the previous year of data posted to the HHS
OCR portal to gain empirical insights into healthcare
IT risks.
As risk informs budget, insurance
allocations, and best practices, the real-live evidence
analysis gives strong indicators of where stronger
mitigating controls should be incorporated into the
organizational Information Systems (IS) and overall
healthcare infrastructure.

1. Introduction
Healthcare entities are under different laws at
different levels of the government hierarchy—
International, Federal, State, and local. The laws are
essential since health is considered a basic human
right; humans from all over the planet can potentially
visit any healthcare entity (United Nations, 2020).
At the Federal level in the United States, there are
two predominate laws for healthcare entities, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) and the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH).
HIPAA was passed by Congress in 1996. HIPAA
was designed to achieve the following: (1) Provide
the ability to transfer and continue health insurance
coverage; (2) Reduce health care fraud and abuse; (3)
Mandate industry-wide standards for health care
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information on electronic billing and other processes;
and (4) Require the protection and confidential
handling of protected health information. In 2009, the
HITECH Act became part of the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). ARRA was created
to motivate the implementation of electronic health
records (EHR) and supporting technology in the
United States (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), 2013).
One of the requirements of HITECH is the public
notification of healthcare breaches of personal
identifying information (PII) if a breach effects 500
or more individuals. When a healthcare breaches this
number of individuals, they can also be fined as part
of a corrective action plan. Both the notifications and
the investigations can cause serious financial burdens
exacerbated by both reputational damages and
required infrastructure improvements. In addition,
patients whom have had their information breached
may be at higher risks of identity theft.
To improve mitigations against data breaches, this
research examines the public notifications of PII
breach trends to inform the healthcare entities of the
most current risks around the United States. These
current risk trends inform organizations as to where
they should be deeply (re)considering and
(re)budgeting for risk mitigations (i.e. NIST 800-53
risk controls (NIST, 2020)) to protect their patients
and their overall healthcare entity from data breaches.

2. Literature Review
There is very little literature in the cybersecurity
and computer science domain considering the risks
learned from an examination of the empirical data
reported on the US HHS OCR Breach Portal.
Schmeelk (2019a) and Schmeelk (Schmeelk, 2019b)
analyzed the breach data on a 1-year interval between
May 1, 2018 through May 1, 2019. The analysis
reported on trends from breach factors reported to the
government to further inform cybersecurity patient
health data risk management.
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Dolezel and McLeod
(2019) examined the
Department of Health and Human Services breach
reporting portal public dataset from the first record
on October 21, 2009 until October 8, 2018.
Specifically, they analyzed the relationship between
data breach characteristics and the number of
individuals affected as protected by the HITECH law.
The analyses revealed that the hacking/IT incident
breach type and network server breach location were
the most significant predictors of the number of
individuals affected. Their analysis showed that
geographic region of a breach occurrence was
insignificant.
Bai, G., Jiang, J. X., & Flasher, R. (2017)
examined the hospital risk of data breaches from the
data reported to the HHS OCR between October 21,
2009, and December 31, 2016. Their research found
that of the 1798 data breaches were reported, 1225
breaches were reported by health care providers.
Additionally, there were 257 breaches reported by
216 hospitals in the data with at least 33 hospitals
involved in more than one breach. Of the breaching
hospitals, the median number of beds was 262 and 52
hospitals were major teaching hospitals.
Liu, V., Musen, M. A., & Chou, T. (2015)
evaluated 949 breaches from the public HHS OCR
HITECH breach dataset. The breaches affected more
than 29 million records between 2010 and 2013. The
researchers found that six breaches involved more
than 1 million records each and the number of
reported breaches increased over time. All states
were reported to have breached. The researchers
adjusted the breach numbers per state with the
population estimates without finding significant
patterns of state populations and breaches.

3. US HHS OCR Data Breach Portal
As required by section 13402(e)(4) of the
HITECH Act, the HHS OCR Secretary must post a
list of breaches of unsecured protected health
information (e.g. patient health identifiers (PHI))
affecting 500 or more individuals. This portals main
page lists all breaches reported within the last 24
months that are currently under investigation by the
Office for Civil Rights (OCR).
Currently the portal posts the following
information: Breach Submission Date, Type of
Breach, Location of Breach, Type of Covered Entity,
State, Business Associate Present, and optionally a
Description. The types of breaches are listed the
following categories: Theft, Hacking/IT Incident,
Unauthorized Access/Disclosure, Improper Disposal,
Loss, Unknown, and Other.
The locations of
breaches are listed in the following categories:
Desktop Computer, Electronic Medical Record,

Email Laptop, Network Server, Other Portable
Electronic Device, Paper/Films, and Other.

4. A Look Back Risk Analysis
This section reports on the last full 12-months of
reported HHS OCR patient data breach information
to inform on future risk trends and potential
mitigations.

4.1. Analysis By State
Analyzing the full year of data breach records by
state provides insight into which states were the
riskiest last year. The previous 1-year of data, as
seen in Figure 1, indicates that Texas had 51 selfreported breaches, the most self-reported breaches of
the states. California was second in the number of
data breaches, self-reporting 41 data breaches. Of the
self-reported breaches, Puerto Rico, West Virginia,
Wyoming, District of Columbia, and Rhode Island
only reported one breach each. The states of Idaho,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Vermont did not self-report any breaches
within the one-year interval.

Figure 1: Data Breaches by States with BAAs

4.2. Analysis By Individual
The number of breaches is not connected to the
number of individuals potentially compromised in a
breach.
Examining the previous year of data
breaches of individuals across the states, the District
of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, we see that the top
five states with the most affected individual’s records
were the following: Minnesota breached the PII of
11,590,390 individuals, Texas breached the PII of
2,419,342 individuals, California breached the PII of
1,042,144 individuals, Florida breached the PII of
832,286 individuals and Oregon breached the PII of
747,173 individuals. A chart can be seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Data Breached Individual PII by States
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4.3. Analysis by BAA
Business Associate Agreements (BAAs) should
be put in place to protect a covered entity (i.e. health
plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health
care providers) whenever an outside entity performs
actions or functions on their behalf. The HIPAA
Privacy Rule only applies to covered entities, it
requires that a covered entity obtain satisfactory
assurances from its business associate that the
business associate will appropriately safeguard the
protected health information it receives or creates on
behalf of the covered entity. The satisfactory
assurances must be in writing, whether in the form of
a contract or other agreement between the covered
entity and the business associate. After a breach
originating with the business associate, if no BAA is
in place, then both the business associate and the
covered entity face corrective actions and fines.
Figure 1 shows the split histogram of breaches
where a BAA is present (histogram top orange color)
and where a BAA is missing (histogram bottom blue
color). As can be seen, most breaches were reported
without a BAA. Specifically, of the 416 breaches
reported between June 2019 and June 2020, no BAAs
were present in 308 breaches and 108 breaches did
indeed have BAAs in place. This shows that there is
higher risk that BAAs are not in place; the empirical
evidence should justify budgeting for better processes
to ensure that business associates conform to BAAs
prior to processing PII on the covered entities’ behalf.

providers are the entities that still need to allocate
more budget and time to the protection of patient PII.

4.5. Analysis by Breach Source
The breach portal categorizes breaches by source
into five categories, as seen in Figure 4. By far, the
predominate methodology of loss of patient PII was
hacking/IT incident. Specifically, the reports for the
year were the following: Hacking/IT Incident reports
totaling 264 breaches, Improper Disposal totaling 12
breaches, Loss totaling 11 breaches, Theft totaling
27 breaches, and Unauthorized Access/Disclosure
totaling 102 breaches. The evidence shows that
healthcare budgets should emphasize and perhaps
increase budgets for mitigating controls of
hacking/IT incidents and unauthorized patient PII
access/disclosure.

Figure 4: All Covered Entities by Breach by Type

Figure 5: All Covered Entities by Breach Location

Figure 3: Breach Entity Data Breach Count

4.4. Analysis By Breach Entity
Data breaches can occur within a health plan,
health care clearinghouse, certain health care
providers, and business associates. Figure 3 shows
the count of data breaches per entity from June 2019
to June 2020. As can be seen, the highest risks are
from healthcare providers. Specifically, the breach
count per entity is as follows: Business Associates
reported breaches 53 times, Health Plans reported
breaches 34 times, Healthcare Clearing Houses
reported breaches one time, and Healthcare Providers
reported breaches 328 times. Clearly, Healthcare

The breach portal categorizes breaches by
location into approximately 35 categories, as seen in
Figure 5. The top sources of the 416 reported data
breaches were the following: Email had 172 reported
breaches, Network Server had 74 reported breaches;
Paper/Films had 42 reported breaches; Other had 27
reported breaches; Electronic Medical Records had
15 reported breaches; Network Server, Other had 15
reported breaches;
Desktop Computer had 10
reported breaches; Laptop had 10 reported breaches;
Other Portable Electronic Device had 10 reported
breaches; Email, Network Server had 7 reported
breaches; and Electronic Medical Record, Network
Server had 5 reported breaches. All the rest had one
or two reported breaches in their source category.
This information shows that healthcare privacy and
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security budgets should amply include mitigating
controls around email, network servers and the
process for the disposal of paper/films records.

4.5.1 Analysis by Health Plan
Managing risk in Health Plans is different than
other covered entities as the risk threats and risk
impact are different than other breached entities. An
examination of the breach sources only within the
Health Plans 34 reported breaches reveals that there
were only three categories of breaches reported as
follows: Hacking/IT Incident reports totaling 19
breaches, Unauthorized Access/Disclosure reports
totaling 13 breaches, and Theft reports totaling 2
breaches. A histogram of the breaches by category
can be seen in Figure 6.

other entities. An examination of the one reported
data breach within the Clearing House category,
specifically a breach reported on March 20, 2020, by
the Georgia Department of Human Services for 500
individuals, indicates that the data was loss through
Paper/Films categories, perhaps during an improper
disposal of records. Interestingly, in this particular
case, the breach was not technology related for the
data indicating that mitigating process controls
should be amply budgeted for in Clearing Houses.

4.5.3 Analysis by Business Associate
Business Associates also have unique risks as the
risk elements of threats and impacts are different than
other entities. Business Associates reported 53
breaches between June 2019 and June 2020. Of the
reports, the two highest categories of breach types
were Hacking/IT Incident with 39 reports and
Unauthorized Access/Disclosure with 11 reports, as
seen in Figure 8.

Figure 6: Health Plan by Breach by Type
Health Plans reported 34 breaches of which the
most breach (i.e. 13) were sourced from email. Each
category of Network Server and Paper/Film breaches
were reported as the source of five breaches. All the
other breach source categories had three or less
reports. A histogram of the breach categories for
Health Plans can be seen in Figure 7.

Figure 8: Business Associate Breach by Type
Business Associates reported that the most
breaches occurred via Email with 27 reports. The
Network Server category had the second highest
number of 12 reports. The other categories had only
one or two reports over the year, as seen in Figure 9.

Figure 7: Health Plan by Breach Location
Figure 9: Business Associate by Breach Location

4.5.2 Analysis by Clearing House

4.5.4 Analysis by Healthcare Provider

Clearing Houses have different risks from the
other covered entities as the processes, procedures
and actual stored patient PII may be different than the

Healthcare Providers (HP) report 328 breaches
from June 2019 to June 2020. The highest category
of breach type was Hacking/IT Incident with 206
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reports followed by Unauthorized Access/Disclosure
with 78 reports. A histogram of the reports can be
seen in Figure 10.

The second largest breach of the year interval,
was from Clinical Pathology Laboratories, Inc.,
which is a Healthcare Provider headquartered in
Texas. They reported the breach of 1,733,836
individuals. on July 15, 2019 from Hacking/IT
Incident on their Network Server. There were no
BAAs in place.
The third largest breach of individuals reported
during the 2019-2020 interval was from Health Share
of Oregon, which is a Health Plan headquartered in
Oregon. The plan reported a breach of 654,362
individuals on February 5, 2020 from Laptop Theft.

4.7. Case Study: State with Most Breaches
Figure 10: Healthcare Providers by Breach Type
Healthcare Providers breach reports indicate that
Email was the number one source category at 132
reports. Then, Network Servers were the second
most breach reported sources with 57 reports.
Finally, Paper/Films were the third highest breach
sources with 33 reports. A histogram of the reports
can be seen in Figure 11.

Texas self-reported the most breaches in the June
2019-2020 interval with 51 reports. Of the reports,
Healthcare Providers consisted of 46 reports,
Business Associates with 4 reports, and one Health
Plan report. The reports of breach categories in the
Texas Healthcare Providers matched the same
distribution as the reports across the country seen in
Figure 4. Interestingly, examining the breach sources
in the Healthcare Providers in Texas showed that the
number one reported breach sources was the Other
category with 15 reports, as seen in Figure 12.

Figure 11: HP by Breach Location

4.5.5 Entity Analysis Source Summary
Examining each breach entity independently
informs on the variations needed for risk
management in the different entities. Healthcare
Providers clearly breach data from many different
categories of locations than the other entities.
However, all the entities share some of the top three
breach types and sources.

4.6. Case Studies: Top Breach Individuals
During June 2019 – June 2020, there were three
top breaches. First, Optum360, LLC., a Business
Associate headquartered in Minnesota reported the
breach of 11,500,000 individuals on July 1, 2019 due
to Hacking/IT Incident of their Network Server. They
did have BAAs in place for their patient data.

Figure 12: Texas HP by Breach Location

4.8. Case Study: Breach State with Least
Six states--Idaho, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont--did not
self-report any data breaches within the one-year
interval to the HHS OCR. Three states, the District
of Columbia, and the Puerto Rico Territory all selfreported only one breach within the interval.
In Puerto Rico, the Intramural Practice Plan of the
Medical Sciences Campus of the University of Puerto
Rico reported a breach on September 16, 2019. The
entity is considered a Healthcare Provider. The selfreport indicated that 439,753 individuals were
affected from a Hacking/IT Incident of a Network
Server. There was not a BAA in place, but perhaps
one was not necessary. Finding any further public
information about the breach was not possible.
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On December 12, 2019, a Business Associate in
the District of Columbia named Service Benefit Plan
Administrative Services Corporation reported a
breach. They reported 11,536 records were involved
in an Unauthorized Access/Disclosure of the Network
Server. They reported having BAAs in place.
The Personal Touch Home Care of W. VA, Inc, a
Healthcare Provider headquartered in West Virginia
reported a breach on January 28, 2020. The breach
involved 1,169 records from a Hacking/IT Incident of
a Network Server and Other category. They report
that BAAs were in place.
In Wyoming, the Healthcare Provider Cheyenne
Regional Medical Center reported a breach on
December 10, 2019.
The Hacking/IT Incident
breached 17,549 records sourcing from Email. The
organization reports not having a BAA in place;
however, perhaps none were needed.
In Rhode Island, the Rhode Island Ear, Nose and
Throat Physicians Inc., reported a breach on August
16, 2019 involving 2,943 records. The entity is
considered a Healthcare Provider, whom fell victim
to a Hacking/IT Incident of their Network Server. A
BAA was not reported in place, but perhaps one was
not needed.

when a breach does not involve a business associate
and indicates that a BAA was not present. In this
case, a BAA would not need to be present if no
outside entity was involved in the reported breach.
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